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1. Introduction 
Unprecedented geopolitical and security changes that culminated in deep political crisis in 
Ukraine in 2014 have brought new challenges to the EU’s external policy towards the East. It 
appeared that the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP) 
failed to prevent escalating civil conflict in Ukraine and withdrawal of some of the EU eastern 
neighbours from the course of European integration. The ENP was born in 2004 with ambitious 
objective to avoid the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and the EU’s 
neighbourhood and to strengthen the prosperity, stability and security beyond the EU borders in 
line with the principle of good neighbourliness. However these objectives look too far to be fully 
achieved today. In the meantime the EU’s neighbourhood is an area of active and hidden civil 
conflicts, intricate border disputes and escalating security threats. Does it mean that the principle 
of good neighbourliness failed to play its role? 
The first part of the chapter is devoted to study of the scope and content of the ENP and the 
EaP and role of the principle of good neighbourliness within these policies. The second part of 
the chapter analyses the impact of the principle of good neighbourliness on the ‘post-Crimea’ 
and ‘post-Donbass’ EU neighbourhood. 
 
2. European Neighbourhood Policy and the principle of good neighbourliness 
The first draft of the ENP was outlined in the European Commission’s Communication ‘On 
Wider Europe’ in March 2003, followed by a Strategy Paper on the ENP in May 2004.1 Hitherto, 
the European Commission made three proposals (in December 2006, in May 2011 and in May 
2012) as to how the ENP could be further strengthened and improved.
2
 Today, the ENP 
framework formally embraces 16 EU's closest geographical and ‘political’ neighbours – Algeria, 
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Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, 
Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. 
Gradually the ENP was further enriched and supplemented with regional and multilateral 
co-operation initiatives: the Eastern Partnership (launched in May 2009), the Union for the 
Mediterranean (the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, formerly known as the Barcelona Process, 
re-launched in Paris in July 2008), the Black Sea Synergy (launched in February 2008), and the 
Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean (launched in 
March 2011). 
The ENP embodies the philosophy of the EU external action towards its neighbourhood 
that is to create ‘“a ring of friends” surrounding the Union and its closes European neighbours, 
from Marocco to Russia and the Black Sea’ ‘sharing everything with the Union not institutions’.3 
In a nutshell the ENP offered the neighbouring countries so called ‘privileged relationship’ with 
the EU that is based on a mutual commitment to European common values (democracy and 
human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy principles and sustainable 
development).
4
 Ultimate objectives of the ENP are: political association and deeper economic 
integration; increased mobility and more people-to-people contacts; access to the EU Internal 
Market. However, the achievement of the above objectives depends on the extent to which the 
European common values are effectively shared by the neighbouring countries. The European 
Commission plays a role of ultimate arbiter of a level of efficiency of sharing the European 
common values by the neighbouring countries by means of issuing yearly country reports. 
Structure and content of these country reports resemble documents produced in time of pre-
accession of the countries of the Central and Eastern Europe. 
The ENP’s core objective is to set up a ‘privileged relationship’5 of the EU with it 
geographical and political neighbours ‘buil[t] on mutual commitment to common values 
principally within the fields of the rule of law, good governance, the respect for human rights, 
including minority rights, the promotion of good neighbourly relations (emphasis added)’.6 The 
ENP founding documents refer to the principle of good neighbourliness in context of need of the 
settlement of conflicts between the EU neighbouring countries which contributes to better 
security on the EU’s borders thereby recognising the principle of good neighbourliness as a part 
of the European common values to be shared by all the EU neighbouring countries.
7
 However 
the ENP does not extend the scope of application of the principle of good neighbourliness 
beyond the EU neighbourhood thereby creating a sort of a dividing line between the EU’s 
neighbouring countries and other third countries which are not embraced by the ENP. In other 
words the ENP targets the promotion of good neighbourly relations only within the EU’s 
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neighbouring countries and the EU. Therefore it is unfortunate that the ENP did not envisage any 
sort of engagement into effective implementation of the principle of good neighbourliness of key 
regional and global security players like the Russian Federation. 
The ENP complements but not substitutes existing bilateral agreements between the EU and 
the neighbouring countries. In the meantime, the ENP countries are parties either to Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) (some of them will became parties to Association 
Agreements with the EU) or to EuroMediterranean Association Agreements (EMAA).
8
 Common 
institutions established under the framework of these agreements monitor the implementation of 
the ENP while the European Commission conducts annual ENP Progress Reports. 
 
 
2.1 Place of the principle of good neighbourliness within the core principles of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy 
 
The ENP is an EU External Policy based on three core principles: differentiation, conditionality 
and joint ownership and common values. These principles are being applied in the course of 
bilateral relations between the EU and every neighbouring country. The principles of 
differentiation, conditionality and joint ownership ensure that any further progress in relations 
between the EU and its neighbouring countries can be developed and more privileged and 
advanced relations can be build up conditional to progress of the neighbouring countries within 
the ENP’s action areas.9 Unfortunately the ENP documents do not regard the principle of good 
neighbourliness as a core principle of the ENP along the principles of differentiation, 
conditionality and joint ownership. Nevertheless the principle of good neighbourliness underpins 
the objective of the settlement of conflicts between the EU neighbouring countries and 
constitutes the foundation of the European common values and must be shared by the parties to 
the ENP. Furthermore it can be argued that the principle of good neighbourliness complements 
the core principles of the ENP. 
 
a) Principle of differentiation 
The principle of differentiation is based on an assumption that individual needs and specifics 
(political, economic, legal, cultural, historical) of each EU neighbouring country must be taken 
into account in the course of the ENP.
10
 For example, the ENP embraces two quite diverse 
groups of the EU’s neighbouring countries. The first group covers countries that signed the 
EMAAs with the EU that is an association relationship but without any perspective of eventual 
EU membership. The second group deals with the former Soviet republics that signed the PCAs. 
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The format of bilateral relations under the framework of the ENP should be marked by some 
differences and specific features. The ENP proclaims that the ‘pace of development of the EU’s 
relationship with each partner country will depend on its degree of commitment to common 
values, as well as its will and capacity to implement agreed priorities’. 11  In other words, 
individual specifics of every neighbouring country and their performance within the ENP action 
areas are crucial for furthering and deepening their bilateral relations with the EU.
12
 Even within 
a distinct geographical group of countries the EU does not pursue homogeneous relations with 
countries of this group. For example the EU’s relations with its eastern neighbouring countries 
take into account pro-European ambitions of Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia and more restrained 
ambitions in countries like Belarus, Azerbaijan and Armenia. The principle of good 
neighbourliness complements the principle of differentiation. Indeed the EU neighbouring 
countries are distinguished by individual domestic security and border situations which must be 
taken into account by the EU in the course of application of the principle of differentiation. For 
example Azerbaijan and Armenia have continuing security dispute over the area of Nagorno-
Karabakh, Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine faced challenge of dealing with unrecognised 
breakaway territories. Therefore the EU’s policies towards these countries must be in line with 
the principles of good neighbourliness and differentiation. 
b) Principle of conditionality 
The principle of conditionality finds frequent references in the EU’s documents on the ENP. 
Referring to the ‘step - by - step approach’ the European Commission stated that ‘new benefits 
should only be offered to reflect the progress made by the partner countries in political and 
economic reform. In the absence of progress, partners will not be offered these opportunities’.13 
The principle of conditionality takes its origin from the EU Accession Process. 
Monitoring mechanism introduced in the ENP resembles the Accession Process applied during 
the latest waves of the EU enlargement. It envisages not only structural incentives but also a 
financial and technical assistance.
14
 
The application of the principle of conditionality in the context of the Accession Process 
required candidate countries to pursue various legal and political reforms as to ensure not only 
the implementation, but also the effective application of the EU acquis, through appropriately 
functioning national administrative and judicial structures which in many cases imply revision of 
national constitutional law.
15
 On the whole, the objective of the principle of conditionality is the 
fulfilment by candidate countries of the Copenhagen and Madrid Criteria in order to qualify for 
the full EU membership. For this purpose the ‘after-Lisbon’ version of Article 49 TEU 
considerably empowers the principle of conditionality. First, the Lisbon Treaty made the EU 
membership conditional on candidate countries’ commitment to ‘respect’ common European 
values listed in Article 2 TEU [human dignity, equality and respect for human rights, including 
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the rights of persons belonging to minorities]. Second, the Lisbon Treaty requires candidate 
countries not only to respect these values and also to be committed to ‘promote’ them.16 From 
practical point of view it could mean that candidate countries should be able to show that they 
pursue their internal and external policies in line with the EU internal (promotion of market 
economy, liberalization of markets) and external (promotion of human rights, fight with 
terrorism and international crime, etc).  
However, in contrast to the Accession Process the ENP incentives are of much lesser scale 
and, therefore, have limited impact on the neighbouring countries.
17
 The ENP and its regional 
initiatives do not pursue an objective of either the full EU membership or the complete wavering 
of visa regime and therefore are not so attractive for third countries as the accession process for 
the countries of the Central and Eastern Europe. Any progress in integration between the EU and 
the neighbouring countries is conditional upon progress made by the latter within specific action 
areas.
18
 So vague and ambitious objectives but without sufficient technical and financial 
assistance on behalf of the EU discouraged the neighbouring countries to pursue effective 
domestic reforms and, in some cases (for example, in Armenia and Ukraine (in the end of 2013)) 
caused considerable dissatisfaction of national governments with the principle of conditionality 
and, eventually, led to abrupt U-turn of their external policies from the EU towards alternative 
integration projects.
19
 It may be argued that the principle of good neighbourliness as well as any 
of the EU’s common values complement the principle of conditionality since any actions 
contrary to the spirit of good neighbourliness (causing security or border conflicts) between the 
EU neighbouring countries would immediately trigger the application of the conditionality on 
behalf of the EU like it was done with regard to Belarus.
20
 
 
c) Principle of joint ownership and common values 
The principle of joint ownership and common values first appeared in the ENP Strategy Paper in 
2004 and means that both the EU and the neighbouring countries have shared participation in 
shaping and implementing the ENP. 
The principle of joint ownership in the ENP is underpinned by the principle of sharing 
common values.
21
 The ENP provides that relations between the EU and the neighbouring 
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countries ‘will build on mutual commitment to common values22 principally within the fields of 
the rule of law, good governance, the respect for human rights, including minority rights, the 
promotion of good neighbourly relations
23
, and the principles of market economy and 
sustainable development’. 24  The EU’s financial and technical support to the neighbouring 
countries will pursue the objective of promoting good neighbourly relations within the EU’s 
neighbourhood.
25
 Therefore the ENP explicitly recognises the principle of good neighbourliness 
as part of the EU common values to be shared by the EU neighbouring countries.  
In spite of their rhetorical reference to ‘shared common values’ the ENP pursues the 
objective of promoting and protecting ‘the EU’s fundamental values and objectives’.26 It also 
relates to the principle of good neighbourliness.
27
 The EU institutions enjoy a privilege of 
defining the content and scope of this principle and to supervise the adherence of the 
neighbouring countries. Therefore the matter of interpretation of the content and scope of the 
principle of good neighbourliness within the ENP belongs exclusively to the EU institutions. 
The principle of joint ownership and common values finds its application in bilateral 
Action Plans that the EU introduced vis-à-vis each neighbouring country. It is envisaged that 
designing and actual implementation of the Action Plans should be done jointly by the EU and a 
concerned neighbouring country. However, there is a lot of criticism towards the actual 
application of the principle of joint ownership and common values.
28
 For example, bilateral 
Action Plans are being regularly monitored by the Commission by means of issuing of annual 
country reports in line with the principles of differentiation, conditionality and joint ownership.
29
 
However, in practice, the Commission’s annual country reports are not always based on 
sufficient knowledge about the interests, expectations and needs of the neighbouring countries.
30
 
 
 
2.2 Action Plans, Association Agenda and Association Agreements 
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24
  European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper (COM(2004) 373 final) p. 8. 
25
 Article 2(e), Regulation (EU) 232/2014 of 11 March 2014 establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument (OJ 
L77/27). 
26
 This view is advocated by many scholars and experts. For example, see Kataryna Wolczuk ‘Implementation 
without Coordination: The Impact of EU Conditionality on Ukraine under the European Neighbourhood Policy’ 
(2009) 61(2) Europe-Asia Studies 187-211. Rilka Dragneva, Kataryna Wolczuk EU Law Export to the Eastern 
Neighbourhood in EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era (P. J. Cardwell ed.) The Hague, 
T.M.C. Asser Press 2012 218-240.  
27
 Article 1, Regulation (EU) 232/2014 of 11 March 2014 establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument (OJ 
L77/27). 
28
 E.g. Julia Langbein ‘European Union Governance towards the Eastern Neigbourhood: Transcending or Redrawing 
Europe's East–West Divide?’ (2014) 52(1) JCMS 157‒174. Lieve Van Hoof, ‘Why the EU is Failing in its 
Neighbourhood: The Case of Armenia’, (2012) 17(2) EFARev. 285‒302. 
29
 Communication from the European Commission ‘On the Commission Proposals for Action Plans under the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)’ COM(2004) 795 final. 
30
 More on this see Elena Korosteleva ‘The European Union and its Eastern Neighbours: Towards a more ambitious 
partnership?’ (Routledge, 2012). Elena Korosteleva (ed) ‘Eastern Partnership: A New Opportunity for the 
Neighbours?’ (Routledge, 2011).  
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Bilateral Action Plans and Association Agenda (applied only towards Ukraine since November 
2009) clarify the precise scope of the EU acquis to be adopted by a neighbouring state. For 
example, in the case of Ukraine, the eventual aims of the ENP are: 1) the establishment of a free 
trade area between the EU and Ukraine; 2) access to selected segments of the EU Internal Market 
and the EU ‘financial packages’.31  
In return for progress in abovementioned fields the EU offers to the neighbouring 
countries greater integration into European programmes and networks, increased technical and 
financial assistance; enhanced access to the EU Internal Market, improved cross border 
cooperation with the EU and visa liberalization. Implementation of the Action Plans by the 
neighbouring countries is closely monitored and regular progress reports are prepared by the 
European Commission. 
The Action Plans do not refer to the principle of good neighbourliness but substitute it 
with ‘cross-border cooperation and shared responsibility in conflict prevention’.32 For instance, 
the EU-Ukraine Action Plan engages Ukraine into solving the Transnistria conflict in Moldova 
but fails to envisage any common action to solve border issues of Ukraine with Russia.
33
 The 
principle of good neighbourliness finds its further articulation in the new generation of the EU 
association agreements (AA) with the eastern neighbouring countries. The EU-Ukraine AA is the 
first of a new generation of AAs to be concluded between the EU and the Eastern Partnership 
countries (Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia).
34
 The negotiations on 
the EU-Ukraine AA were launched in September 2008 and successfully completed in December 
2011. The signature of the political part of the EU-Ukraine AA took place on 21 March 2014 in 
Brussels.
35
 As a whole text the EU-Ukraine AA (including the titles on sectoral cooperation and 
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area) was signed on 27 June 2014 in Brussles together 
with the AAs with Moldova and Georgia and ratified by the European Parliament and the 
Parliament of Ukraine (Verhovna Rada) on 16 September 2014. The AAs essentially aim to 
deepen the political and economic relations between Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia and the EU 
through the establishment of an enhanced institutional framework and innovative provisions on 
regulatory and legislative approximation. Of particular significance of the AAs is the ambition to 
set up a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTA), leading to gradual and partial 
integration of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia in the EU internal market.
36
 Accordingly, the AAs 
belong to the selected group of ‘integration-oriented agreements’, i.e. agreements including 
principles, concepts and provisions which are to be interpreted and applied as if Ukraine, 
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 Texts of the Action Plans and Association Agenda are available at <http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/documents/action-
plans/index_en.htm>, accessed 19.06.2014. 
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 For example, see the EU-Ukraine Action Plan. 
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 Ibid, at 2.1. 
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 EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (OJ L161/2014). 
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part of the volumnious agreement. See A. Rettman, ‘EU and Ukraine sign 2% of association 
treaty’<http://euobserver.com/foreign/123574> accessed 22.06.2014. 
36 For more detail see Odysseas Spiliopolus ‘The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement as a Framework of Integration 
between the Two Parties’ (2014) 9 Procedia Economics and Finance 256-263. Peter Van Elsuwege, Guillaume Van 
der Loo, Roman Petrov ‘The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement: Assesment of an Innovative Legal 
Instrument’ EUI Working Papers, 2014/09. Available at <http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/32031>, 
accessed 20.09.2014. 
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Moldova and Georgia accede to the EU. The principle of good neighbourliness was given a 
prominent place among the essential elements of the AAs between the EU and its eastern 
neighbours.
37
 Furthermore this principle is encapsulated in provisions of the AAs on regional 
stability wherein it provides that ‘the Parties shall intensify their joint efforts to promote stability, 
security and democratic development in their common neighbourhood, and in particular to work 
together for the peaceful settlement of regional conflicts’.38 The regional stability provisions in 
the AAs between the EU and its eastern neighbours are ad hoc tailored in order to reflect specific 
countries security issues of concern in line with the principle of differentiation. For example the 
article on regional stability in the EU-Moldova AA contains the commitment of the Parties ‘to a 
sustainable solution to a Transnistrian issue, in full respect of the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the Republic of Moldova’.39 Similar provision in the EU-Georgia AA underlines that 
the Parties ‘shall work towards peaceful settlement of the unresolved conflicts in the region’40 
thereby meaning the frozen conflict between Georgia and Russia over Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. However the AAs are nowhere close to providing any firm commitments on the EU to 
provide any sort of military, financial or technical assistance in case escalating security threats to 
the parties of the agreements. 
 
3. The principle of good neighbourliness and security challenges in the countries of the 
Eastern Partnership 
3.1 The Eastern Partnership as a case for assessing the effectiveness of the principle of good 
neighbourliness 
The Eastern Partnership (EaP) represents a perfect case to assess the effectiveness of the 
application of the principle of good neighbourliness in practice. This policy was born as a region 
tailored EU’s policy towards the countries of Eastern Europe and Southern Caucasus. Initiated in 
May 2009 at the Prague Summit, the EaP fosters the necessary conditions to accelerate political 
association and further economic integration between the EU and Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.
41
  
Since its launch in 2009, the EaP has gone a long way in shaping the agenda of 
cooperation and answering needs in relations between the EU and its eastern neighbours.
42
 The 
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 Article 2 of the EU-Ukraine AA, the EU-Georgia AA and the EU-Moldova AA provide that ‘Promotion of respect 
for the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, inviolability of borders and independence, as well as 
countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, related materials and their means of delivery also 
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38
 Article 9 of the EU-Ukraine AA, Article 8 of the EU-Georgia AA, Article 8 of the EU-Moldova AA. 
39
 Article 8 of the EU-Moldova AA. Text of the AA is available on the web site of the EU External Action Service 
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 Article 8 of the EU-Georgia AA. Text of the AA is available on the web site of the EU External Action Service 
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41
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42
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increased financial assistance; deeper cooperation on environment and climate issues; increased people-to-people 
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initiative has given rise to new platforms for dialogue at the government and expert level 
(thematic platforms), as well as in the fields of parliamentary and participatory democracy 
(Euronest; Civil Society Forum and the Conference of the Regional and Local Authorities). 
The EaP enhances the scope of the ‘shared values’ concept by engaging the neighbouring 
countries to ‘the commitment to common values’.43  For this purpose the Action Plans and 
Association Agenda contain specific priorities intended to strengthen the commitment to shared 
values and to adoption of the EU dynamic acquis. The pace of the eastern neighbouring countries 
reforms aimed at adoption of the EU acquis is being regularly monitored by the European 
Commission. 
Unfortunately the initial format of the EaP did not take into account several factors that 
eventually led to serious failures of the entire policy. First, the EaP completely ignored the so 
called ‘Russian factor’. It means the EaP failed to engage the Russian Federation (as an observer) 
at least into some of its action platforms. Consequently from the very beginning the Russian 
Federation displayed a great degree of alienation towards the EaP. It simply considered the EaP 
as a geopolitical project aimed at limiting the Russian area of influence over post-Soviet 
republics.
44
 Consequently the Russian Federation expressed its lack of trust towards the EaP with 
regard to the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. On numerous occasions the Russian 
Federation emphasised that it was necessary and justice to be involved into negotiations on the 
AAs (especially with regard to the EU-Ukraine AA) and proposed numerious amendments to the 
association agreement with Ukraine just on eve of its ratification by both parties.
45
 As a result of 
Russian pressure doubled with open military support of militant separatists groups in the East of 
Ukraine the EU and Ukraine had to share negotiation table with representatives of the Russian 
government. This process led to unprecedented compromise. The EU and Ukraine agreed to 
postpone the establishment of the DCFTA between them for a year till January 2016. Instead the 
Russian Federation agreed to maintain free trade relations with Ukraine for the same duration.
46
 
It was one of the first occasions in history of EU external relations when a third party intervened 
into the process of implementation of already signed EU external agreement. 
Second, the EaP documents pay very little attention to the external application of the 
principle of good neighbourliness beyond the borders of the EU’s eastern neighbouring countries. 
Instead the EaP focuses on ‘better governance of its Eastern borders’ like the Transnistria border 
between Moldova and Ukraine and does not envisage any assistance to Georgia and Armenia in 
solving their border and security conflicts with Russia and Azerbaijan respectively.
47
 These 
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 For instance, the ENP Strategy Paper provides: ‘The privileged relationship with neighbours will build on mutual 
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44
 Sergey Lavrov, ‘State of the Union Russia–EU: Prospects for Partnership in the Changing World’ (2013) 51 
JCMS 6‒12. 
45
 Delphine d’Amora ‘Russia Wants Say in EU-Ukraine Association’, available at 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/russia-wants-to-amend-eu-ukraine-association-deal/506064.html, 
accessed 20.09.2014. 
46
 Joint Ministerial Statement on the Implementation of the EU-Ukraine AA/DCFTA, Brussels, 12 September 2014, 
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-14-276_en.htm, accessed 20.09.2014. 
47
 For instance if the ENP Strategy Paper encourages the participation of the Russian Federation ‘as a partner in 
regional cooperation’ (Communication from the European Commission ‘European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy 
Paper’ COM(2004) 373 final) the Commission’s Communication of the EaP explicitly states that ‘The European 
Union has a vital interest in seeing stability, better governance and economic development at its Eastern borders’ 
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shortages of the EaP seriously undermined any chances of effective application of the principle 
of good neighbourliness within and beyond the EU’s eastern neighbourhood. 
 
3.2  Security challenges within the countries of the Eastern Partnership and the principle of 
good neighbourliness 
It must be admitted that since the launch of the EaP the principle of good neighbourliness has not 
contributed to better stability and security in the region. On the opposite, the overall security 
situation in the EU’s neighbouring countries has gradually deteriorated. Currently almost all 
countries of the EaP have unresolved border security conflicts either with other EU’s 
neighbouring countries or with third countries (mainly with the Russian Federation).
48
 A key EaP 
country Ukraine has been plunged into flames of bloody civil conflict since April 2014. 
Moldova experiences prolonged conflict with its breakaway part Transnistria (so called 
Pridenstrovian Moldovan Republic). This territory is not recognised by any of the UN members 
and formally constitutes part of the Republic of Moldova (Transnistria autonomous territorial 
unit with special legal status). However, de facto, Transnistria is an independent state with strong 
presence of Russian military troops.
49
 The EU is engaged in solving the Transnistrian conflict via 
the European Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM). This structure as 
part of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy helps to control traffic on borders between 
Moldova and Ukraine around Transnistria in order to prevent illegal movements of people and 
goods from and to Transnistria.
50
 
Armenia and Azerbaijan are in dispute over status of the self proclaimed and not 
recognised Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. Conflict over this territory led to large scale war 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan that ended in ceasefire in 1994. 
Georgia went through a military conflict with Russia over the breakaway areas of 
Abkhasia and South Ossetia. The conflict took place August 2008 and led to many casualties and 
loss of control of Georgia over Abkhasia and South Ossetia.
51
 Currently Russian military troops 
are stationed in Abkhasia and South Ossetia and de facto control their territories. 
The EU played quite modest role in settling the conflict in the Caucasus allowing some 
EU Member States to lead the peace process in the region.
52
 No sanctions were applied by the 
EU in the aftermath of the Georgian-Russian conflict. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Communication from the Commission and the European Parliament to the Council ‘Eastern Partnership’ (COM 
(2008) 823 final) and omits any references to Russia in this context. 
48
 They are: dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over status of the self proclaimed and not recognised 
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic; military conflict between Georgia and Russia over the breakaway areas of Abkhasia 
and South Ossetia; conflict between Moldova and with its breakaway part Transnistria; annexation of Crimea by 
Russia. 
49
 Russian 14th Army has been present in the region of Transnistria since the start of the conflict. For more 
information see < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transnistria>, accessed 20.09.2014. 
50
 Xymena Kurowska and Benjamin Tallis, ‘Border Assistance Mission: Beyond Border Monitoring?’ (2009) 14(1) 
EFARev. 47‒64. 
51
 For more detail see Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, available at 
<http://www.ceiig.ch>, accessed 30 May 2014. 
52
 SyuzannaVasilyan, ‘The External Legitimacy of the EU in the South Caucasus’ (2011) 16(3) EFARev. 341‒357. 
Richard G. Whitman, and Stefan Wolff, ‘The EU as a conflict manager? The case of Georgia and its implications’ 
(2010) 86(1) International Affairs 87‒107. George Christou, ‘Multilateralism, Conflict Prevention, and the Eastern 
Partnership’ (2011) 16(3) EFARev. 207‒225. 
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However the next security challenge within the EaP compelled the EU to act and to apply 
sanctions against one of the leading geopolitical players on the European continent – the Russian 
Federation. It happened after self proclaimed authorities the Autonomous Republic of Crimea 
hold unrecognised referendum under Russian military presence in March 2014. As a result of 
this the integral part of Ukraine – the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol 
– were annexed by the Russian Federation and incorporated by the Russian Federation as own 
federal subjects on March 21, 2014. The fact of annexation is not recognised by Ukraine and the 
United Nations
53
 and is universally considered as blatant violation of international public law by 
the Russian Federation.
54
 
Following turbulent events in Crimea the EU decided to apply wide scale sanctions 
against Russia. The EU sanctions led to a complete halt in the EU-Russia relations (suspension 
of bilateral talks on visa matters and on new EU-Russia agreement, cancellation of the EU-
Russia summit) and to imposing measures against ‘certain persons responsible for actions which 
undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine’ (travel 
bans and asset freezes).
55
 The list of these persons is constantly increasing and covers leading 
Ukrainian, Russian and Crimean politicians related to the fact of the Crimea’s annexation. The 
EU had to extend the scope of sanctions against Russia after the security situation in Ukraine has 
drastically deteriorated by the end of the summer 2014. The world was shocked when Malaysia 
Airline flight MH17 was shot down above the part of Eastern Ukraine controlled by pro-Russian 
separatists. This incident caused the loss of 298 lives and drastically deteriorated security 
situation in the region and in the EU. Bloodshed conflict between Ukraine and armies of self 
proclaimed ‘peoples republics’ of Donetsk and Lugansk led to several thousand casualties and 
about a million refugees from the East of Ukraine.
56
 The EU Member States had to speak with 
one voice in order to show their solidarity against direct Russian involvement into civil conflict 
in Ukraine. As a result the EU Member States agreed on new level of sanctions against Russian 
and Ukrainian officials and nationals involved in supporting the separatists’ movement in the 
Donbass region of Ukraine. Hitherto, the EU’s sanctions against Russia concerned the following 
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issues: diplomatic measures (cancellation of the EU-Russia political dialogue and dismantling of 
G8); restrictive measures (asset freezes and visa bans of persons and entities responsible for 
actions against Ukraine’s territorial integrity); restrictions for Crimea and Sevastopol; “economic” 
sanctions against Russia (prohibition of exports of arms, energy and military related technologies 
and dual use goods, freezing economic cooperation). 
It is too early to judge the effectiveness of the EU sanctions at the time of writing of this 
paper. On the one hand, the mere fact of issue of the EU sanctions provides a promising picture 
of the EU solidarity against violations of international law within the EU neighbourhood. The 
threat of wide scale retaliatory measures on behalf of the Russian Federation against the EU did 
not prevent the issue of “economic” sanctions against it. On the other hand, the EU can not 
afford immediate large scale sanctions against its third trading partner - Russia due to its reverse 
effect on the EU’s economy, especially in the field of energy. 
The EU sanctions were issued upon unanimous decision of all the EU Member States on 
basis of Article 215 TFEU as part of the CFSP. This fact represents evident solidarity of all EU 
Member States facing a violation of territorial integrity of one of its nearest neighbours which is 
about to enter into association relations with the EU. Nevertheless neither of the EU acts on 
sanctions against the Russian Federation refers to the principle of good neighbourliness. It shows 
that the EU does not consider that violation of the principle of good neighbourliness as a 
legitimate basis of sanctions is not inclined to extend the application of this principle beyond the 
territory of its neighbouring countries. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
Having outlined the nature and scope of application of the principle of good neighbourliness 
within the ENP we can turn to the concluding remarks. 
The ENP was devised as a framework policy of the EU towards its immediate neighbours 
based on core principles of differentiation, conditionality, joint ownership and adherence to 
common values. Formally the principle of good neighbourliness complements the ENP’s core 
principles and thereby occupies important place under the framework of the ENP and the EU’s 
regional policies. In practice many of the ENP’s objectives including the effective application of 
the principle of good neighbourliness have not been successfully achieved. For instance the ENP 
has not prevented escalation of old and new border and security conflicts within and beyond the 
EU’s neighbourhood (Georgia-Russia war, annexation of Crimea). One of the reasons of this is 
the fact that the ENP contains declarative means and, unfortunately, does not offer practical tools 
for better application of the principle of good neighbourliness in the EU’s neighbourhood. For 
instance the ENP failed to engage the parties into effective sharing of the principle of good 
neighbourliness especially in relation to the Caucasus region. Instead most of the ENP’s human 
and financial resources have been invested into ensuring security control over the EU’s Eastern 
and Southern borders. It would seem logical therefore to encourage better engagement of the 
neighbouring countries into truly joint building and implementation of the principle of good 
neighbourliness within the EU and beyond. One of the solutions is to extend the scope of 
application of the principle of good neighbourliness beyond the EU’s neighbourhood in 
cooperation with key security players in the region. The new generation of the AAs between the 
EU and the eastern neighbouring countries places the principle of good neighbourliness among 
essential elements of the agreements. Therefore it gives some hopes that the new regulatory 
framework offered by the AAs will improve the status quo and contribute to safe and good 
neighbourly ‘ring of friends’ around the EU borders and beyond. 
